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M1: a document that encrypts only its embedded files opens without a password
A crypt filter whose /AuthEvent is /EFOpen needs its password only when an embedded file is accessed (ISO 32000-2 7.6.6, Table 25). A document whose strings and streams are in the clear (/StmF, /StrF /Identity) and whose encrypting filters are all EFOpen ones, /EFF naming one, now opens without a password in cos and in the renderer (hayro-syntax patch 36). Without the password there is no file key: the embedded files' data is held and saved as stored, and Document::embedded_files_locked and reads_as_stored say so. Asking for such an attachment's bytes is an error. A full save that would renumber data whose key mixes in the object number (RC4, AES-128), or change the document's security, is refused. The password still opens the document and its attachments. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Pq7HyDBXygTf7jcqdsjcfn
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mtlcl410andClaude Opus 5.5 committed
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@@ -199,11 +199,12 @@ impl Document {
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// Read here, while nothing is decrypted yet.
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let members = self.encryption_members(enc);
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let handler = match credentials {
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Credentials::Password(password) => Arc::new(pdfcraft_crypt::SecurityHandler::open(params, &id0, *password).map_err(|e| match e {
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pdfcraft_crypt::CryptError::WrongPassword if password.is_none() => CosError::NeedsPassword,
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pdfcraft_crypt::CryptError::WrongPassword => CosError::WrongPassword,
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other => CosError::Security(other.to_string()),
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})?),
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Credentials::Password(password) => match pdfcraft_crypt::SecurityHandler::open(params.clone(), &id0, *password) {
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Ok(handler) => Arc::new(handler),
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Err(pdfcraft_crypt::CryptError::WrongPassword) if password.is_none() => Arc::new(self.without_password(&dict, params)?),
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Err(pdfcraft_crypt::CryptError::WrongPassword) => return Err(CosError::WrongPassword),
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Err(other) => return Err(CosError::Security(other.to_string())),
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},
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// The same encryption as the document whose key this is: that key opens it.
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Credentials::Handler { handler, id0: known } if *handler.dict() == params && *known == id0 => Arc::clone(handler),
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Credentials::Handler { .. } => return Err(CosError::NeedsPassword),
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@@ -217,6 +218,27 @@ impl Document {
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Ok(())
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}
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/// The handler for a document opened without a password that only its embedded files need
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/// (see [`crate::security::efopen_only`]), else `NeedsPassword`. Not a repair: ISO 32000-2
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/// §7.6.6 has such a document open so; [`Document::embedded_files_locked`] tells it.
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fn without_password(&self, dict: &Dict, params: pdfcraft_crypt::EncryptDict) -> Result<pdfcraft_crypt::SecurityHandler, CosError> {
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let handler = crate::security::efopen_only(self, dict).then(|| pdfcraft_crypt::SecurityHandler::without_key(params)).flatten();
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handler.ok_or(CosError::NeedsPassword)
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}
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/// Whether the document opened without the password its embedded files need (`/AuthEvent
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/// /EFOpen`): their data is held, and saved, as stored, and isn't to be read as the files.
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pub fn embedded_files_locked(&self) -> bool {
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self.security.as_deref().is_some_and(|h| !h.has_key())
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}
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/// Whether `s`, a stream of this document, holds encrypted data that reads as stored because the
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/// document opened without the password its embedded files need (see
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/// [`Document::embedded_files_locked`]). Such data isn't the file it encrypts.
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pub fn reads_as_stored(&self, s: &crate::Stream) -> bool {
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self.security.as_deref().is_some_and(|h| crate::security::stream_reads_as_stored(self, h, s))
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}
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/// The first file identifier, part of the encryption key (empty when there is none).
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fn first_id(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
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let id = self.trailer.get(b"ID").map(|id| self.resolve(id));
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@@ -128,6 +128,46 @@ pub(crate) fn encrypt_dict(doc: &Document, d: &Dict) -> EncryptDict {
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}
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}
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/// Whether every crypt filter of `d`, an `/Encrypt` dictionary, that encrypts at all (`/CFM`
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/// `V2`, `AESV2` or `AESV3`) is authorised only when an embedded file is opened (`/AuthEvent
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/// /EFOpen`, ISO 32000-2 §7.6.6, Table 25), and `/EFF` names one of them: what a document asks
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/// for its embedded files alone, which it opens without (§7.6.6: "EFOpen Authorization shall be
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/// required when accessing embedded files"). Its strings and streams have to be in the clear too,
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/// which [`SecurityHandler::without_key`] checks.
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pub(crate) fn efopen_only(doc: &Document, d: &Dict) -> bool {
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let name = |d: &Dict, k: &[u8]| d.get(k).and_then(|v| doc.resolve(v).as_name().map(<[u8]>::to_vec));
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let Some(cf) = d.get(b"CF").map(|c| doc.resolve(c)).and_then(|c| c.as_dict().cloned()) else { return false };
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let mut encrypting = Vec::new();
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for (k, v) in cf.iter() {
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let Some(f) = doc.resolve(v).as_dict().cloned() else { continue };
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if !matches!(name(&f, b"CFM").as_deref(), Some(b"V2" | b"AESV2" | b"AESV3")) {
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continue;
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}
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if name(&f, b"AuthEvent").as_deref() != Some(b"EFOpen") {
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return false;
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}
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encrypting.push(k.clone());
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}
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name(d, b"EFF").is_some_and(|eff| encrypting.contains(&eff))
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}
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/// Whether `s`, read from a document whose handler has no file key, holds data that handler would
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/// decrypt, which therefore reads as stored: still encrypted.
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pub(crate) fn stream_reads_as_stored(doc: &Document, h: &SecurityHandler, s: &Stream) -> bool {
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if h.has_key() {
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return false;
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}
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let _scope = FollowScope::enter();
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let named = named_crypt_filter(doc, &s.dict);
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let ty = s.dict.get(b"Type").map(|t| followed(doc, t));
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let kind = match (&named, ty.as_deref().and_then(Object::as_name)) {
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(Some(n), _) => StreamKind::Named(n),
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(None, Some(b"EmbeddedFile")) => StreamKind::EmbeddedFile,
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_ => StreamKind::Normal,
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};
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h.decrypts(kind)
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}
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/// Whether `f`, an entry of a `/Filter` chain or its only filter, is `/Crypt`.
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fn is_crypt(doc: &Document, f: &Object) -> bool {
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followed(doc, f).as_name() == Some(b"Crypt")
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@@ -272,6 +272,16 @@ pub fn write_full(doc: &Document, opts: &SaveOptions) -> Result<Vec<u8>, CosErro
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if doc.stream_limited() {
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return Err(CosError::ReadOnlyLimit);
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}
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// Opened without the password its embedded files need, a document holds their data as stored:
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// new security would encrypt that data again (or drop its encryption), and renumbering breaks
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// a key that mixes in the object number.
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if let Some(h) = doc.security().filter(|h| !h.has_key())
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&& (doc.encryption_changed() || !h.survives_renumbering())
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{
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return Err(CosError::Security(
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"the embedded files are encrypted and the document was opened without their password: open it with the password to change its security or save it in full".into(),
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));
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}
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// A full traversal must not fill the editor's shared caches (which undo snapshots also
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// own). Parsed objects and decoded object streams are temporary working data here.
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let mut reader = doc.object_reader();
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@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
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//! A document that encrypts only its embedded files, authorised when one is opened (`/AuthEvent
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//! /EFOpen`, ISO 32000-2 §7.6.6, Table 25): it opens without a password, its pages read as stored,
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//! and its embedded files keep their encrypted bytes, flagged as such, through every save.
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use std::sync::Arc;
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use pdfcraft_cos::{Algorithm, CosError, Document, NewEncryption, ObjRef, Object, SaveOptions, write_full, write_incremental};
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use pdfcraft_crypt::StreamKind;
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const PAGE: &str = "BT /F1 12 Tf 20 100 Td (Visible page) Tj ET";
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const ATTACHED: &[u8] = b"the attached file's own words";
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const PASSWORD: &str = "attach pw";
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const EMBEDDED: ObjRef = ObjRef { num: 6, generation: 0 };
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const CONTENT: ObjRef = ObjRef { num: 4, generation: 0 };
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fn hex(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
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bytes.iter().map(|b| format!("{b:02X}")).collect()
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}
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/// One page in the clear and one attachment encrypted with `/StdCF`, whose `/AuthEvent` is
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/// `auth_event`: AES-256 (V5, R6) or AES-128 (V4, R4), `/StmF` and `/StrF` `/Identity`.
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fn fixture(algorithm: Algorithm, auth_event: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
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let id0 = [7u8; 16];
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let params =
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NewEncryption { algorithm, user_password: PASSWORD, owner_password: "owner pw", permissions: -4, encrypt_metadata: true, seed: [3; 32] };
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let handler = pdfcraft_crypt::create(¶ms, &id0).unwrap();
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let d = handler.dict();
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let cipher = handler.encrypt_stream(EMBEDDED.num, 0, ATTACHED, StreamKind::EmbeddedFile);
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let (version, cfm, r6) = match algorithm {
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Algorithm::Aes256 => ("/V 5 /R 6", "/AESV3 /Length 32", format!("/OE <{}> /UE <{}> /Perms <{}>", hex(&d.oe), hex(&d.ue), hex(&d.perms))),
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_ => ("/V 4 /R 4 /Length 128", "/AESV2 /Length 16", String::new()),
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};
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let encrypt = format!(
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"<< /Filter /Standard {version} /O <{}> /U <{}> {r6} /P {} /CF << /StdCF << /AuthEvent /{auth_event} /CFM {cfm} >> >> /StmF /Identity /StrF /Identity /EFF /StdCF >>",
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hex(&d.o),
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hex(&d.u),
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d.p
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);
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let mut objs: Vec<Vec<u8>> = vec![
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b"<< /Type /Catalog /Pages 2 0 R /Names << /EmbeddedFiles << /Names [(note.txt) 5 0 R] >> >> >>".to_vec(),
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b"<< /Type /Pages /Kids [3 0 R] /Count 1 /MediaBox [0 0 300 200] >>".to_vec(),
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b"<< /Type /Page /Parent 2 0 R /Contents 4 0 R >>".to_vec(),
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format!("<< /Length {} >>\nstream\n{PAGE}\nendstream", PAGE.len()).into_bytes(),
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b"<< /Type /Filespec /F (note.txt) /UF (note.txt) /EF << /F 6 0 R >> >>".to_vec(),
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];
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let mut stream = format!("<< /Type /EmbeddedFile /Length {} >>\nstream\n", cipher.len()).into_bytes();
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stream.extend_from_slice(&cipher);
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stream.extend_from_slice(b"\nendstream");
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objs.push(stream);
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objs.push(encrypt.into_bytes());
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let mut out = b"%PDF-1.7\n".to_vec();
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let mut offsets = Vec::new();
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for (i, o) in objs.iter().enumerate() {
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offsets.push(out.len());
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out.extend_from_slice(format!("{} 0 obj\n", i + 1).as_bytes());
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out.extend_from_slice(o);
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out.extend_from_slice(b"\nendobj\n");
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}
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let xref = out.len();
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out.extend_from_slice(format!("xref\n0 {}\n0000000000 65535 f \n", objs.len() + 1).as_bytes());
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for o in offsets {
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out.extend_from_slice(format!("{o:010} 00000 n \n").as_bytes());
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}
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let trailer = format!(
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"trailer\n<< /Size {} /Root 1 0 R /Encrypt 7 0 R /ID [<{}> <{}>] >>\nstartxref\n{xref}\n%%EOF\n",
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objs.len() + 1,
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hex(&id0),
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hex(&id0)
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);
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out.extend_from_slice(trailer.as_bytes());
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out
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}
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fn stream(doc: &Document, r: ObjRef) -> pdfcraft_cos::Stream {
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match &*doc.get(r) {
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Object::Stream(s) => s.clone(),
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other => panic!("object {} isn't a stream: {other:?}", r.num),
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}
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}
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/// The attachment as the password reads it from `bytes`.
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fn attachment_with_password(bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Vec<u8> {
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let doc = Document::open_with_password(Arc::new(bytes), Some(PASSWORD)).unwrap();
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assert!(!doc.embedded_files_locked());
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let embedded = doc.root().and_then(|r| doc.get(r).as_dict().cloned()).unwrap();
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assert!(embedded.get(b"Names").is_some());
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stream(&doc, EMBEDDED).decoded().unwrap()
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}
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#[test]
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fn a_document_encrypting_only_its_embedded_files_opens_without_a_password() {
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let bytes = fixture(Algorithm::Aes256, "EFOpen");
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let doc = Document::open(Arc::new(bytes.clone())).unwrap();
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assert!(doc.embedded_files_locked());
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// Not a repair: the specification has it open so.
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assert!(doc.repair_log().is_empty(), "{:?}", doc.repair_log());
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assert!(doc.trailer().get(b"Encrypt").is_some());
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// The page reads as stored; the attachment keeps its encrypted bytes and says so.
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let content = stream(&doc, CONTENT);
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assert_eq!(content.decoded().unwrap(), PAGE.as_bytes());
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assert!(!doc.reads_as_stored(&content));
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let embedded = stream(&doc, EMBEDDED);
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assert!(doc.reads_as_stored(&embedded));
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assert_ne!(embedded.decoded().unwrap(), ATTACHED);
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// The password still opens it, and reads the attachment.
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assert_eq!(attachment_with_password(bytes.clone()), ATTACHED);
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// A wrong password is still refused.
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assert!(matches!(Document::open_with_password(Arc::new(bytes), Some("nope")), Err(CosError::WrongPassword)));
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}
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#[test]
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fn a_crypt_filter_authorised_when_the_document_opens_still_needs_the_password() {
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let bytes = fixture(Algorithm::Aes256, "DocOpen");
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assert!(matches!(Document::open(Arc::new(bytes.clone())), Err(CosError::NeedsPassword)));
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assert_eq!(attachment_with_password(bytes), ATTACHED);
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}
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#[test]
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fn saves_keep_the_encrypted_embedded_files_as_stored() {
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for algorithm in [Algorithm::Aes256, Algorithm::Aes128] {
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let mut doc = Document::open(Arc::new(fixture(algorithm, "EFOpen"))).unwrap();
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assert!(doc.embedded_files_locked(), "{algorithm:?}");
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let root = doc.root().unwrap();
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doc.update_dict(root, |c| c.set(b"PageMode".to_vec(), Object::name("UseAttachments"))).unwrap();
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// An incremental save keeps /Encrypt, and the attachment decrypts with the password.
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let saved = write_incremental(&doc, &SaveOptions::default()).unwrap();
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assert_eq!(attachment_with_password(saved), ATTACHED, "{algorithm:?}");
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// A full save renumbers: AES-256 keys don't depend on the number, AES-128 keys do.
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match algorithm {
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Algorithm::Aes256 => {
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let full = write_full(&doc, &SaveOptions::default()).unwrap();
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let reopened = Document::open(Arc::new(full.clone())).unwrap();
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assert!(reopened.embedded_files_locked());
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let doc = Document::open_with_password(Arc::new(full), Some(PASSWORD)).unwrap();
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let names = doc.root().and_then(|r| doc.get(r).as_dict().cloned()).unwrap();
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let tree = doc.resolve(names.get(b"Names").unwrap()).as_dict().cloned().unwrap();
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let files = doc.resolve(tree.get(b"EmbeddedFiles").unwrap()).as_dict().cloned().unwrap();
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let list = doc.resolve(files.get(b"Names").unwrap()).as_array().cloned().unwrap();
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let spec = doc.resolve(&list[1]).as_dict().cloned().unwrap();
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let ef = doc.resolve(spec.get(b"EF").unwrap()).as_dict().cloned().unwrap();
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let file = match &*doc.resolve(ef.get(b"F").unwrap()) {
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Object::Stream(s) => s.decoded().unwrap(),
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other => panic!("{other:?}"),
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};
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assert_eq!(file, ATTACHED);
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}
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_ => assert!(matches!(write_full(&doc, &SaveOptions::default()), Err(CosError::Security(_))), "{algorithm:?}"),
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}
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}
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}
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#[test]
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fn security_cannot_change_without_the_embedded_files_password() {
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let mut doc = Document::open(Arc::new(fixture(Algorithm::Aes256, "EFOpen"))).unwrap();
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doc.remove_encryption();
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assert!(matches!(write_full(&doc, &SaveOptions::default()), Err(CosError::Security(_))));
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assert!(matches!(write_incremental(&doc, &SaveOptions::default()), Err(CosError::Security(_))));
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}
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@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
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mod bounded_writer;
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mod corpus;
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mod efopen;
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mod encryption;
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mod generations;
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mod proptests;
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+41
-1
@@ -222,6 +222,42 @@ impl SecurityHandler {
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Ok(Self::new(dict, key, auth, recovered_user))
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}
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/// A handler with no file key, for a document opened without a password whose strings and
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/// streams aren't encrypted and whose encrypted crypt filters are all ones the caller found
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/// authorised only when an embedded file is opened (`/AuthEvent /EFOpen`, ISO 32000-2 §7.6.6,
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/// Table 25). Data such a filter encrypts is left as stored, read and written alike, so it
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/// keeps its encrypted bytes; [`SecurityHandler::decrypts`] tells which. `None` when strings or
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/// streams are encrypted, which needs the key, or the handler is older than crypt filters (V4).
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pub fn without_key(dict: EncryptDict) -> Option<Self> {
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if dict.v < 4 {
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return None;
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}
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let methods = Methods::new(&dict);
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if methods.string != Method::Identity || methods.stream != Method::Identity {
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return None;
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}
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Some(Self { dict, key: Vec::new(), auth: Auth::User, recovered_user: None, methods })
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}
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/// Whether the handler has the file key: false for [`SecurityHandler::without_key`].
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pub fn has_key(&self) -> bool {
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!self.key.is_empty()
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}
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/// Whether data of `kind` is encrypted, so that reading it needs the file key.
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pub fn decrypts(&self, kind: StreamKind) -> bool {
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self.method(Some(kind)) != Method::Identity
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}
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/// Whether data left as stored by a handler without the key still decrypts after its object
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/// is renumbered: only AES-256 doesn't mix the object number into the key (Algorithm 1.A).
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pub fn survives_renumbering(&self) -> bool {
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[self.methods.string, self.methods.stream, self.methods.embedded_file]
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.into_iter()
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.chain(self.methods.named.values().copied())
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.all(|m| matches!(m, Method::Identity | Method::Aes256))
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}
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/// Upgrade to owner access with the owner (permissions) password, as when a restricted
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/// document is unlocked after opening. The user password, or any other, is `WrongPassword`.
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/// Both passwords unlock the same file key, so what was decrypted so far stays valid; a
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@@ -255,7 +291,7 @@ impl SecurityHandler {
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/// `/P` as `/Perms` holds it: AES-256 ECB of one block (= CBC with a zero IV), marked `adb`.
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fn perms_p(&self) -> Option<i32> {
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if !matches!(self.dict.r, 5 | 6) {
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if !matches!(self.dict.r, 5 | 6) || !self.has_key() {
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return None;
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}
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let plain = aes_cbc_decrypt(&self.key, &[0; 16], self.dict.perms.first_chunk::<16>()?, false);
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||||
@@ -307,6 +343,10 @@ impl SecurityHandler {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn apply(&self, method: Method, num: u32, generation: u16, data: &[u8], encrypt: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
// Without the key, encrypted data stays as stored (see `without_key`).
|
||||
if !self.has_key() {
|
||||
return data.to_vec();
|
||||
}
|
||||
match method {
|
||||
Method::Identity => data.to_vec(),
|
||||
Method::Rc4 => rc4(&self.object_key(method, num, generation), data),
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -231,9 +231,14 @@ impl<'a> Inspector<'a> {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Fetch an attachment's bytes (decoded). Capped at 1 GiB to defuse decompression bombs.
|
||||
/// Fetch an attachment's bytes (decoded). Capped at 1 GiB to defuse decompression bombs. A
|
||||
/// document opened without the password its embedded files need (`/AuthEvent /EFOpen`, ISO
|
||||
/// 32000-2 §7.6.6) holds them encrypted: asking for one is an error, never its encrypted bytes.
|
||||
pub fn attachment_data(bytes: &[u8], password: Option<&str>, att: &Attachment) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
|
||||
let run = || -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
|
||||
if pdfcraft_cos::Document::open_with_password(std::sync::Arc::new(bytes.to_vec()), password).is_ok_and(|d| d.embedded_files_locked()) {
|
||||
return Err("the attachment is encrypted: open the document with its password to read it".into());
|
||||
}
|
||||
let options = load_options(password);
|
||||
let doc = Document::load_mem_with_options(bytes, options).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
|
||||
let insp = Inspector::new(&doc);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1912,3 +1912,82 @@ fn inspection_keeps_no_private_page_data() {
|
||||
};
|
||||
assert_eq!(report(with), report(without), "what inspection reports does not change");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The password values (`/O`, `/U`, `/OE`, `/UE`, `/Perms`) of an AES-256 (R6) protection with a
|
||||
/// user password, as a save writes them.
|
||||
fn r6_password_values() -> String {
|
||||
let plain = b"%PDF-1.7\n1 0 obj << /Type /Catalog /Pages 2 0 R >> endobj\n2 0 obj << /Type /Pages /Kids [] /Count 0 >> endobj\ntrailer << /Root 1 0 R >>\n%%EOF".to_vec();
|
||||
let mut doc = pdfcraft_cos::Document::open(Arc::new(plain)).unwrap();
|
||||
doc.set_encryption(&pdfcraft_cos::NewEncryption {
|
||||
algorithm: pdfcraft_cos::Algorithm::Aes256,
|
||||
user_password: "user pw",
|
||||
owner_password: "owner pw",
|
||||
permissions: -4,
|
||||
encrypt_metadata: true,
|
||||
seed: [5; 32],
|
||||
})
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let saved = pdfcraft_cos::write_full(&doc, &pdfcraft_cos::SaveOptions::default()).unwrap();
|
||||
let saved = pdfcraft_cos::Document::open_with_password(Arc::new(saved), Some("user pw")).unwrap();
|
||||
let encrypt = saved.resolve(saved.trailer().get(b"Encrypt").unwrap());
|
||||
let encrypt = encrypt.as_dict().unwrap();
|
||||
["O", "U", "OE", "UE", "Perms"]
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.map(|k| {
|
||||
let value = saved.resolve(encrypt.get(k.as_bytes()).unwrap());
|
||||
let hex: String = value.as_string().unwrap().bytes.iter().map(|b| format!("{b:02X}")).collect();
|
||||
format!("/{k} <{hex}>")
|
||||
})
|
||||
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
|
||||
.join(" ")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A document whose crypt filter `/StdCF` is authorised by `auth_event`, encrypting only its
|
||||
/// embedded file (`/StmF /StrF /Identity`, `/EFF /StdCF`), protected by a user password.
|
||||
fn efopen_pdf(auth_event: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let encrypt = format!(
|
||||
"<< /Filter /Standard /V 5 /R 6 {} /P -4 /CF << /StdCF << /AuthEvent /{auth_event} /CFM /AESV3 /Length 32 >> >> /StmF /Identity /StrF /Identity /EFF /StdCF >>",
|
||||
r6_password_values()
|
||||
);
|
||||
let objs = [
|
||||
"<< /Type /Catalog /Pages 2 0 R /Names << /EmbeddedFiles << /Names [(note.txt) 4 0 R] >> >> >>".to_string(),
|
||||
"<< /Type /Pages /Kids [3 0 R] /Count 1 >>".to_string(),
|
||||
"<< /Type /Page /Parent 2 0 R /MediaBox [0 0 200 200] >>".to_string(),
|
||||
"<< /Type /Filespec /F (note.txt) /EF << /F 5 0 R >> >>".to_string(),
|
||||
"<< /Type /EmbeddedFile /Length 32 >>\nstream\n0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef\nendstream".to_string(),
|
||||
encrypt,
|
||||
];
|
||||
let mut out = b"%PDF-1.7\n".to_vec();
|
||||
let mut offsets = Vec::new();
|
||||
for (i, o) in objs.iter().enumerate() {
|
||||
offsets.push(out.len());
|
||||
out.extend_from_slice(format!("{} 0 obj\n{o}\nendobj\n", i + 1).as_bytes());
|
||||
}
|
||||
let xref = out.len();
|
||||
out.extend_from_slice(format!("xref\n0 {}\n0000000000 65535 f \n", objs.len() + 1).as_bytes());
|
||||
for o in offsets {
|
||||
out.extend_from_slice(format!("{o:010} 00000 n \n").as_bytes());
|
||||
}
|
||||
out.extend_from_slice(
|
||||
format!("trailer\n<< /Size {} /Root 1 0 R /Encrypt 6 0 R /ID [<00> <00>] >>\nstartxref\n{xref}\n%%EOF\n", objs.len() + 1).as_bytes(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// ISO 32000-2 §7.6.6, Table 25: a crypt filter whose `/AuthEvent` is `/EFOpen` needs its password
|
||||
/// only when an embedded file is opened. Such a document opens without one, and its attachment is
|
||||
/// listed, but asking for the attachment's bytes is an error, not its encrypted data.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn a_document_encrypting_only_its_embedded_files_opens_without_a_password() {
|
||||
let bytes = Arc::new(efopen_pdf("EFOpen"));
|
||||
assert!(check_pages(bytes.clone(), None, 1).is_ok());
|
||||
let info = inspect(bytes.clone(), None).expect("opens without a password");
|
||||
assert_eq!(info.pages.len(), 1);
|
||||
let listed = info.attachments.iter().find(|a| a.name == "note.txt").expect("the attachment is listed");
|
||||
let refused = attachment_data(&bytes, None, listed).expect_err("encrypted bytes aren't the file");
|
||||
assert!(refused.contains("password"), "{refused}");
|
||||
// Authorised when the document opens, the same filter still needs the password.
|
||||
let doc_open = Arc::new(efopen_pdf("DocOpen"));
|
||||
assert!(matches!(inspect(doc_open.clone(), None), Err(OpenError::NeedsPassword)));
|
||||
assert!(matches!(check_pages(doc_open, None, 1), Err(OpenError::NeedsPassword)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
Vendored
+1
-1
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Other resource categories retain their existing parent-chain lookup.
|
||||
| hayro | 0.7.1 | Apache-2.0 OR MIT | (1) `RenderSettings::{x_offset, y_offset}` to render one tile of a large page; (2) images over `MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS` (2^28) are skipped (a fuzzed `/W 4294967295` hung in resampling); (3) `tiling_cell_scale` keeps a tiling pattern's cell pixmap within 3000 px a side whatever its `/XStep`/`/YStep` (a fuzzed step far beyond `/BBox` allocated 2 GB); (4) stroke widths clamped to 4 × (canvas width + height) device pixels (a fuzzed `/LW 9223372036854775807` allocated 10 GB in stroke expansion); (5) `usable_dash_pattern`: a stroke whose dash pattern could cut it into more than `MAX_DASHES_PER_STROKE` (250,000) pieces, counting kurbo's restart of the pattern at every subpath and `ClosePath`, is drawn solid (a fuzzed `/D [[11] 0]` on a line from x = 92234775807 allocated over 5 GB, `[0.000001] 0 d` on a 20 pt line over 10 GB); (6) a dash pattern with a negative or non-finite entry, or a period that isn't positive, is drawn solid (`[-1 -1] 0 d` looped for ever in kurbo); (7) `render_size` and `render_into`: render into a buffer the caller allocates (PdfCraft renders into pixel-aligned memory that the GUI takes over as texture data); `render` is `render_into` on a new pixmap; (8) checked image source/target/RGBA, alpha-premultiplication scratch and intermediate sizes before resampling, finite transforms and exact source/mask buffers; sources wider than u16 may shrink before backend limits, with a 2^20 source-axis cap and conservative 128 MiB filter-planning estimate; an over-limit or failed resize keeps the original image resolution and geometry when the source fits the backend, otherwise skips it, with a logged warning; staging, resampling output/scratch, RGBA conversion and padding buffers use fallible reserves; (9) `may_paint_canvas`: a fill or stroke whose control-point box, grown by how far its paint reaches past the path (half the stroke width times the larger of the miter limit and √2) plus 0.5 user units and 2 pixels, misses the canvas is not drawn, so a tile no longer strokes and fills every path of its page (item 5 of #623); `set_skip_offscreen_paths` turns this off for the regression test; (10) `/Interpolate` governs the pre-resize too (#624): a minified image that does not request interpolation is pre-resized with nearest-neighbour (since (21), only inside Type 3 glyphs), planned without the Catmull-Rom filter limits (`image_resampling_size` takes the flag); a Type 3 glyph image is sampled bicubically only when interpolated; a minified image with a matching soft mask is nearest-sampled straight into premultiplied RGBA; (11) `may_paint_rect`: an image whose stream-size box, mapped to the device, misses the canvas is skipped before decoding (decoded data can only shrink against that box), so a tile of an image-heavy page no longer decodes, resamples and rasterizes every image on it; (12) preview renders (`InterpreterSettings::preview`: backdrops, thumbnails, grid cells, signature-drag backgrounds) skip images under `PREVIEW_MIN_IMAGE_AREA` device pixels, while final renders always draw them; (13) reading colours (#897): `RenderSettings::color_replacement` takes a `ColorReplacement` (text colour, background, `only_black`, `line_art`) that remaps solid text and line-art paint while rendering, glyph outlines counting as text and stencil-mask ink as line art; images, image alpha masks, soft masks and pattern cells keep their colours; `render_pdf` gains a `color_replacement: Option<ColorReplacement>` argument (pass `None` for true colours); the upstream-only `[dev-dependencies.log]` entry is removed from `Cargo.toml` (log is a normal dependency since the logging patch), so `cargo test -p hayro` runs this crate's unit tests; (14) a shrunk image that is interpolated (or, since (21), area-averaged) and whose axes lie along the device's (upright, mirrored or a quarter turn, as on a page under `/Rotate`) is snapped to whole device pixels: shrunk once to its rounded device rectangle (halves round up, so a tile snaps an edge where the whole page does) and drawn 1:1 from the rounded corner, instead of a ceil-sized raster resampled again at a fractional scale and offset (`snap_minified_image`; scans looked soft next to Acrobat, and until #5530 a turned one still did, up to 200 grey levels off the same page drawn upright). An image counts as axis-aligned when the terms the snap drops move its far edges by at most a hundredth of a device pixel (`SNAP_SKEW`), not by a tolerance on the coefficients, which let a slight skew of a very wide image through; and the snapped 1:1 transform is used only when the shrink produced the snapped size, so a failed resize keeps the full transform instead of drawing the source raster at its source size; (15) a soft mask of another size than its image is filtered when shrunk, whatever its `/Interpolate` (#1649): such a mask carries the shape on its own (Word saves text as a tiny black image with a glyph-bitmap mask), and nearest-neighbour dropped every stroLine truncated
|
||||
| hayro-jbig2 | 0.3.0 | Apache-2.0 OR MIT | (1) at most 2^28 pixels per bitmap and page bitmap, and 2^25 cells per halftone grid and grayscale image (each side could be 65535: 4.3 billion pixels decoded one by one, and a 4-byte value per cell); (2) at most 2^26 symbol pixels per symbol dictionary (a fuzzed dictionary decoded for minutes); (3) a symbol dictionary's height classes are capped at one per new symbol and its export runs at `2 × symbols + 1`, each plus `EXTRA_EMPTY_STEPS` (1024): an empty height class or a zero-length export run doesn't advance, and past the end of its data the arithmetic decoder can decode them for ever (one changed byte hung the renderer); (4) a segment header's long-form referred-to segment count is capped at `u16::MAX` and a larger count is refused before its retention or referred-to bytes are read: the 29-bit count went straight to `Vec::with_capacity`, a reservation of about 2 GiB whose failure aborts the process (from storytold/craft-libs#176); (5) what a page's segments hold for later ones (intermediate regions, pattern and symbol dictionaries with their headers and retained contexts, and Huffman tables) is at most 64 MiB, two square bitmaps of 16,384 a side (`MAX_RETAINED_WORDS`), and a dictionary's new and exported symbols are counted against it as they are made: each was bounded on its own, but a few dozen bytes an intermediate region held 33 MB each, and 8 MiB symbols exported again and again killed the process, so a few kilobytes could exhaust memory; (6) a segment may refer to at most 2^20 symbols, checked before any are collected: references may repeat, and 65,535 of them to one dictionary, in a 78 KB stream, asked for 17 GB; (7) a pattern dictionary keeps at most 16 MiB of shifted copies, which only speed up drawing, and none that wouldn't fit what the page has left (`MAX_SHIFTED_WORDS`); (8) a custom Huffman table has at most 2^16 lines, and a stream with its globals at most 2^20 segments and 2^22 references, checked as they are read: both grew before anything counted them, and PDFs of a kilobyte or so reached 5 GB and more behind nested Flate; (9) a page past the bounds of (1) is refused when the stream is opened: a caller sizes its output from the header before the page bitmap is made, and an Indexed image in a 743-byte PDF asked for 137 GB, which aborts; (10) a stream may ask for at most 2^30 units of decoding work, four of the largest pages, about 6 s to 17 s (`MAX_WORK`): decoding a bitmap costs a pixel each and 4 a row, copying one a word each and 1 a row, and each integer an item reads costs 38, what one takes at worst, so one with no pixels pays too, before it is decoded: each bitmap was bounded, but nothing bounded how many there were, and a 795-byte PDF took 265 s; (11) `Image::decode_within` spends from what a run of images may still do, starting with its page's pixels, and `charge_reading` charges reading a stream and its globals before anything is parsed, so an operation over a document can bound what `MAX_WORK` bounds for one image, and images that fail or decode nothing add up too: a file of thousands of images made to reach that limit took as many times as long; (12) adding to a location, a reference offset, a symbol's corner or a Huffman range line near the end of an `i32`, and negating a decoded integer of 2^31, overflowed: a panic wherever overflow is checked. The refinement context, a text region's corners, the integer decoder and the Huffman table wrap, as a release build did, and `Bitmap::combine` saturates, which comes to the same, as a location that overflows is past the end of any page. What is drawn doesn't change; (13) a bitmap filled with a default pixel of 1 (a page, or an intermediate text or halftone region) had 1s past its width in the last word of each row, and a refinement, which reads its reference a word at a time, read them as pixels where the standard has 0 (6.3.5.2): refining such a reference not a multiple of 32 wide decoded to other pixels than were coded, release builds too. `Bitmap::clear_padding` clears those bits when a bitmap is filled with 1s, as cutting symbols and patterns from a collective bitmap already did. Ghostscript reads the test's page and text streams as they decode now; (14) a region's location is unsigned (5.4.4), so one past `i32::MAX` is off the page, where the decoder took it for a signed one: a region there was drawn back onto the page from the left or the top (at 0xFFFFFFFC, four pixels left of it), and a refinement there, of the page or of a region at the same place (7.4.7.5), was refused as an overflow, and the page with it. `Bitmap::combine_region` keeps such a location past the page. A refinement of another region refines it where it is, as Table 35 has it (GRREFERENCEDX and GRREFERENCEDY 0), whatever the two locations say; a refinement of the page, see (16); (15) a refinement whose reference is offset right of it (GRREFERENCEDX above 0, which a refined text instance has from a wider bitmap, TaLine truncated
|
||||
| lopdf | 0.45.0 | MIT | (1) PNG predictor rows longer than the data are refused before their buffers are allocated (a fuzzed `/Columns 4294967295` allocated two 4 GiB rows), and empty frames return without row buffers; (2) predictor row widths use saturating arithmetic or reject overflow; (3) sub-byte TIFF Predictor 2 scratch is bounded by the samples present in the input instead of the declared `/Colors`, aligned with [lopdf#589](https://github.com/J-F-Liu/lopdf/pull/589); (4) the object lookup keeps its cycle history through compressed objects, requires an ordinary in-file container, and caps the chain of indirect lookups at 16 (a chain of new objects, each a `/Length` compressed in a container whose own `/Length` names the next, or a stream whose `/Length` names the next stream, overflowed the stack: a dev build's 2 MiB thread within 800 hops); (5) object-stream members are parsed within their own extent (up to the next distinct offset), an entry whose offset repeats an earlier entry's is skipped (so a repeated object number can resolve to its earlier entry), and offsets are processed in index order; (6) `find_latest_trailer`: a rebuild takes a `/Type /XRef` stream dictionary as the trailer when the file has no `trailer` keyword (the latest in the file wins, as a later `trailer` would), so a concatenated or truncated file keeps its /Info and /ID instead of failing to load; a candidate whose /Root is the catalog beats one whose /Root is another dictionary, and an in-file /Root must match its generation (#2365) | (1) `inspect::tests::png_predictor_rows_longer_than_the_data_are_refused_before_allocating`, `inspect::tests::empty_png_predictor_frames_do_not_allocate_rows`; (2) `inspect::tests::tiff_subbyte_predictor_row_width_overflow_is_refused`; (3) `inspect::tests::tiff_subbyte_predictor_scratch_is_bounded_by_available_samples`, `inspect::tests::tiff_subbyte_predictors_keep_components_rows_and_padding`; (4) `inspect::tests::compressed_object_self_container_does_not_recurse`, `inspect::tests::compressed_object_mutual_containers_do_not_recurse`, `inspect::tests::object_stream_length_cycle_does_not_recurse`, `inspect::tests::compressed_object_container_chain_does_not_recurse`, `inspect::tests::compressed_length_chain_does_not_recurse`, `inspect::tests::plain_stream_length_chain_does_not_recurse`, `inspect::tests::compressed_objects_and_indirect_stream_length_still_load`, `inspect::tests::compressed_length_in_a_container_with_an_indirect_length_still_loads`; (5) `inspect::tests::object_stream_member_extents_bound_owned_strings`, `inspect::tests::object_stream_member_extents_preserve_index_order_and_whitespace`; (6) `inspect::tests::rebuilt_file_keeps_the_info_of_its_cross_reference_stream`, `inspect::tests::rebuilt_file_prefers_a_trailer_whose_root_is_the_catalog` |
|
||||
| hayro-syntax | 0.7.2 | Apache-2.0 OR MIT | (1) Page-tree cycle guard in `resolve_pages` (visited set + depth cap): a `/Kids` loop among compressed objects overflowed the stack and aborted the process; (2) `ccitt_size_ok`: CCITT images wider than 2^20 columns or over 2^28 pixels are not decoded (a fuzzed `/Columns 4294967295` allocated 4 GiB); (3) Flate/LZW predictor row widths are saturating `usize`, a zero width is refused and a row longer than the data is not allocated (a fuzzed `/Columns 9223372036854775807` wrapped to a 2^61-byte allocation and aborted); (4) the inline-image end-of-data check (`EI`) doesn't nest inside its own look-ahead and examines at most 256 candidates and steps (50 images with "EI" in their data ran for over ten minutes); an EI followed by a delimiter (EI%..., EI[...) ends the image like one followed by white space; only a regular character after EI skips the candidate; (5) a stream whose `/Length` is wrong is recovered only when `stream` is the next token — scanning ahead to a later object's `stream` made an indirect appearance-state dictionary (Quartz checkboxes: `/AP /N` → `<< /Yes … /Off … >>`) render as a non-form, so the widget was skipped; (6) JPX rescaling uses an exact integer sample range for 1–32-bit components (32 shifted past u32, and floating-point maxima at 25–31 bits wrapped to zero), and refuses zero-sized rows; (7) `decode_limit`: Flate (through flate2 and the fallback inflater), LZW, RunLength and ASCII85 never write past `MAX_DECODED_STREAM` (256 MiB), or, for the last filter of an image of known size, past twice its pixel bytes (a predictor tag byte per byte), at most 1 GiB; `Stream::decoded_within` for budgeted callers; a page's `/Contents` array shares one `MAX_DECODED_STREAM` (a 2 MB page whose content stream or 8 × 8 image inflated to 2 GB took the renderer past 3 GB in under a second; naming the stream twenty times in `/Contents`, 5 GB); (8) high-precision numbers (jsPDF MediaBox coordinates with over 19 digits) parse without overflowing the u64 mantissa: fractional digits past it are dropped, integer digits past it scale the value (a real, kept finite); (9) large dictionary indexes are built on first use and shared across repeated reads within each PDF (#307); the validated-byte cache is bounded, reader contexts remain separate, repairs and inline/content dictionaries bypass sharing, and small dictionaries stay eager; (10) decoded object-stream slots publish once under contention, cold loading rejects recursive dependencies, and xref repair serializes without holding recursive read guards; this permits one parser per native render pool with private worker caches; (11) `sync.rs`: a poisoned lock is recovered instead of unwrapped (a worker panic no longer cascades into every reader of the same PDF), and xref repair takes a blocking write lock instead of asserting a non-blocking one; (12) `SegmentList` (`util.rs`) returns `None` for an out-of-range index instead of panicking; (13) a page's `/UserUnit` scales `render_dimensions` and `initial_transform`, so the page and everything on it are sized in points, as Acrobat shows them; it is read as Acrobat reads it (the page's own entry, not inherited; a number from 1 up, at most 75,000; anything else counts as 1), and a page without it keeps exactly the transform it had; (14) revision 2–4 passwords are tried as given and then in PDFDocEncoding (`legacy_passwords` in `crypto/mod.rs`, which resolves the upstream `TODO: Convert to PDFDocEncoding`): passwords arrive as UTF-8 text, so a password with characters outside ASCII (`Çok güzel`, `ılık€`) written in PDFDocEncoding, as ISO 32000-2 §7.6.4.3.2 asks and qpdf and Acrobat write it, was always wrong; (15) page content is read a piece at a time (`page::ContentReader`, `Page::content_reader`): plain streams and Flate streams without a predictor are decoded as they are read, with a budget of 64 times their compressed size and never less than `MAX_DECODED_STREAM` (a stream that expands past it is cut and reported); other streams are decoded whole, as before, and share `MAX_DECODED_STREAM`. The content tokenizer reads a window at a time (`UntypedIter::new_window`, `TypedIter::needs_more`, `TypedIter::committed`): an instruction that runs past the window is not decided until more data follows, which `Reader` records by flagging reads and `at_end` past the end of the data, including through the clones the parser makes. The Flate decoder keeps its own 32 KiB history, so it pauses at any output size. `ContentReader::new` reuses raw/decrypted stream bytes for budget accounting and piece creation, and `decoded_raw_within` applies the existing Whole-stream filters and limits to those bytes without decrypting twice; (16) revision 5–6 (AES-256) passwords are tried in their SASLprep form (RFC 4013, then UTF-8, at most 127 bytes, as ISO 32000-2 §7.6.4.3.3 Algorithm 2.A asks and pdfcraft-crypt writes them) and then, if that differs, as given (`aes256_passwLine truncated
|
||||
| hayro-syntax | 0.7.2 | Apache-2.0 OR MIT | (1) Page-tree cycle guard in `resolve_pages` (visited set + depth cap): a `/Kids` loop among compressed objects overflowed the stack and aborted the process; (2) `ccitt_size_ok`: CCITT images wider than 2^20 columns or over 2^28 pixels are not decoded (a fuzzed `/Columns 4294967295` allocated 4 GiB); (3) Flate/LZW predictor row widths are saturating `usize`, a zero width is refused and a row longer than the data is not allocated (a fuzzed `/Columns 9223372036854775807` wrapped to a 2^61-byte allocation and aborted); (4) the inline-image end-of-data check (`EI`) doesn't nest inside its own look-ahead and examines at most 256 candidates and steps (50 images with "EI" in their data ran for over ten minutes); an EI followed by a delimiter (EI%..., EI[...) ends the image like one followed by white space; only a regular character after EI skips the candidate; (5) a stream whose `/Length` is wrong is recovered only when `stream` is the next token — scanning ahead to a later object's `stream` made an indirect appearance-state dictionary (Quartz checkboxes: `/AP /N` → `<< /Yes … /Off … >>`) render as a non-form, so the widget was skipped; (6) JPX rescaling uses an exact integer sample range for 1–32-bit components (32 shifted past u32, and floating-point maxima at 25–31 bits wrapped to zero), and refuses zero-sized rows; (7) `decode_limit`: Flate (through flate2 and the fallback inflater), LZW, RunLength and ASCII85 never write past `MAX_DECODED_STREAM` (256 MiB), or, for the last filter of an image of known size, past twice its pixel bytes (a predictor tag byte per byte), at most 1 GiB; `Stream::decoded_within` for budgeted callers; a page's `/Contents` array shares one `MAX_DECODED_STREAM` (a 2 MB page whose content stream or 8 × 8 image inflated to 2 GB took the renderer past 3 GB in under a second; naming the stream twenty times in `/Contents`, 5 GB); (8) high-precision numbers (jsPDF MediaBox coordinates with over 19 digits) parse without overflowing the u64 mantissa: fractional digits past it are dropped, integer digits past it scale the value (a real, kept finite); (9) large dictionary indexes are built on first use and shared across repeated reads within each PDF (#307); the validated-byte cache is bounded, reader contexts remain separate, repairs and inline/content dictionaries bypass sharing, and small dictionaries stay eager; (10) decoded object-stream slots publish once under contention, cold loading rejects recursive dependencies, and xref repair serializes without holding recursive read guards; this permits one parser per native render pool with private worker caches; (11) `sync.rs`: a poisoned lock is recovered instead of unwrapped (a worker panic no longer cascades into every reader of the same PDF), and xref repair takes a blocking write lock instead of asserting a non-blocking one; (12) `SegmentList` (`util.rs`) returns `None` for an out-of-range index instead of panicking; (13) a page's `/UserUnit` scales `render_dimensions` and `initial_transform`, so the page and everything on it are sized in points, as Acrobat shows them; it is read as Acrobat reads it (the page's own entry, not inherited; a number from 1 up, at most 75,000; anything else counts as 1), and a page without it keeps exactly the transform it had; (14) revision 2–4 passwords are tried as given and then in PDFDocEncoding (`legacy_passwords` in `crypto/mod.rs`, which resolves the upstream `TODO: Convert to PDFDocEncoding`): passwords arrive as UTF-8 text, so a password with characters outside ASCII (`Çok güzel`, `ılık€`) written in PDFDocEncoding, as ISO 32000-2 §7.6.4.3.2 asks and qpdf and Acrobat write it, was always wrong; (15) page content is read a piece at a time (`page::ContentReader`, `Page::content_reader`): plain streams and Flate streams without a predictor are decoded as they are read, with a budget of 64 times their compressed size and never less than `MAX_DECODED_STREAM` (a stream that expands past it is cut and reported); other streams are decoded whole, as before, and share `MAX_DECODED_STREAM`. The content tokenizer reads a window at a time (`UntypedIter::new_window`, `TypedIter::needs_more`, `TypedIter::committed`): an instruction that runs past the window is not decided until more data follows, which `Reader` records by flagging reads and `at_end` past the end of the data, including through the clones the parser makes. The Flate decoder keeps its own 32 KiB history, so it pauses at any output size. `ContentReader::new` reuses raw/decrypted stream bytes for budget accounting and piece creation, and `decoded_raw_within` applies the existing Whole-stream filters and limits to those bytes without decrypting twice; (16) revision 5–6 (AES-256) passwords are tried in their SASLprep form (RFC 4013, then UTF-8, at most 127 bytes, as ISO 32000-2 §7.6.4.3.3 Algorithm 2.A asks and pdfcraft-crypt writes them) and then, if that differs, as given (`aes256_passwLine truncated
|
||||
| winit | 0.30.13 | Apache-2.0 | (1) on Windows 11 (build 22000 and later), `WM_DPICHANGED` applies the rect Windows suggests. It used to nudge the window onto the monitor `MonitorFromWindow` names, which during a drag is still the monitor being left; the nudge sent another `WM_DPICHANGED`, so a window dragged to a monitor with another scale factor grew and stayed on the wrong monitor at the wrong scale (#324). Backport of winit master 488c036a ([winit#4341](https://github.com/rust-windowing/winit/pull/4341)), which no 0.30 release has; Windows 10 keeps the old adjustment, as on winit master. (2) on Wayland, a seat's text input is destroyed when the seat goes away, not whenever it loses a capability: losing any capability (a touch screen or tablet unplugged, a remote-desktop session ending) destroyed it, and only an added capability recreated it, so IME stopped working until restart. Port of [winit#4747](https://github.com/rust-windowing/winit/pull/4747); (3) on Windows, an IME composition reports its cursor from `GCS_CURSORPOS` only when `WM_IME_COMPOSITION` says it is set, and at the end of the composition otherwise: the Microsoft Korean IME never sets it, so the cursor read as 0 (egui then drew no caret while composing; it now draws it after the syllable). Port of [winit#4746](https://github.com/rust-windowing/winit/pull/4746); (4) on Windows, a hidden window is not maximized until it is shown, and a hidden window shown while maximized gets one `ShowWindow(SW_MAXIMIZE)`: `SW_MAXIMIZE` shows a hidden window, so PdfCraft, which eframe keeps hidden until its first frame is drawn, appeared unpainted (white) when it restored a maximized window, and could lose its focus. Port of [winit#4587](https://github.com/rust-windowing/winit/pull/4587) (the later, focus-safe form of [winit#4575](https://github.com/rust-windowing/winit/pull/4575)); (5) on X11, when allowing or disallowing IME replaces the focused window's input context (egui does it each time a text field gains or loses focus), the new context is focused: no focus event follows, so it stayed unfocused until the window lost and regained focus. Port of [winit#4727](https://github.com/rust-windowing/winit/pull/4727); (6) on macOS, `insertText` commits through IME when a composition was started (`pending_commit`, set by `setMarkedText`) rather than when marked text is left: input methods that end a composition with `unmarkText` before `insertText` lost the text, and Apple Korean dropped the key typed after a syllable (`한` then `5` or `;`); other `insertText` calls stay `KeyboardInput`; a commit outside a key press (a candidate clicked with the mouse, dictation) clears the marked text and leaves no key to swallow, as in [winit#4748](https://github.com/rust-windowing/winit/pull/4748) (without it the next key, such as Backspace, was lost). `validAttributesForMarkedText` lists the underline and marked-clause attributes, without which some input methods don't compose. Port of [winit#4650](https://github.com/rust-windowing/winit/pull/4650), the 0.30 backport of [winit#4651](https://github.com/rust-windowing/winit/pull/4651) (merged on winit master), with the underline attribute spelled as AppKit's `NSUnderlineStyleAttributeName` (`NSUnderline`); (7) on macOS, disallowing IME with a composition in progress (focus leaving a text field) tells the input method to discard its marked text (`discardMarkedText`): it kept composing it once IME was allowed again, so the abandoned syllable came back (`하`, then `가` typed in the next field, became `학`, then `하` + `가`; Japanese `か` then `さ` became `傘`). Port of [winit#4745](https://github.com/rust-windowing/winit/pull/4745); (8) on macOS, text inserted outside a key press without a composition (the emoji picker) is reported as `Ime::Commit`; it was dropped. Port of the emoji-picker part of [winit#4749](https://github.com/rust-windowing/winit/pull/4749) (0.30 backport of [winit#4748](https://github.com/rust-windowing/winit/pull/4748)); its `selectedRange` change for dictation is left out because it switches on press-and-hold for every held key (an accent menu instead of key repeat, and the chosen accent added after the repeated letters); (9) on macOS, a key whose text was committed through IME isn't also sent as `KeyboardInput` unless AppKit forwards it as a command (Enter): Apple Korean answers Space with no syllable in progress with `setMarkedText(" ")`, `insertText(" ")`, `setMarkedText("")`, and the last call reset winit's state, so the space arrived twice. Same goal as [winit#4478](https://github.com/rust-windowing/winit/pull/4478), whose changes don't reach this call order (macOS 14); to be proposed upstream there; (10) on macOS, when the first key in a fresh app reaches Apple Korean's `insertText` as a raw compatibility jamo instead of starting a composition, that key is interpreted once more, synchronously, before it is sent as `KeyboardInput` (g k s typed ㅎㅏㄴ instead of 한); only an unmodified, Line truncated
|
||||
| egui-wgpu | 0.36.2 | MIT OR Apache-2.0 | (1) `winit::surface_fit`: a window's surface is configured within the device's `max_texture_dimension_2d`, both sides shrunk by one factor that egui then draws at (`pixels_per_point × render_scale`), so the whole window is drawn into the surface (on DX12 it is stretched over the window and lines up with the pointer; wgpu's GL backend copies it unscaled into a corner); the longer side becomes exactly the limit; the depth and MSAA textures follow, and a recreated surface starts again from the window's own size. egui-wgpu configured the window's size as is, and `Surface::configure` panics beyond the limit: a window restored at another monitor's scale (opening an Outlook attachment on a mixed-DPI laptop asked an 8192-pixel device for 8600 × 3423, #577) or stretched across monitors closed PdfCraft, before its window appeared when it happened at start-up ([emilk/egui#8361](https://github.com/emilk/egui/issues/8361)). The published crate leaves out egui's licence files; `LICENSE-APACHE` and `LICENSE-MIT` are from the 0.36.2 tag; (2) `winit::catch_errors`: a new window's surface is configured inside wgpu error scopes (validation, out of memory, internal), and a failure is returned as `WgpuError::ConfigureSurface` (for the root window at start-up eframe returns it as `Error::Wgpu`, which PdfCraft retries with OpenGL); nothing is kept for the window. wgpu's default handler panicked instead, and eframe configures the root surface before the app is created, so a driver that can't configure one closed PdfCraft at launch (a 2015 Intel GPU through wgpu's GL backend timed out waiting for the GPU to go idle, `GpuWaitTimeout`, #519). Unchanged, so still a panic: an error in a later reconfigure (resize, a lost surface), a device lost during the first configure (wgpu reports it only to a callback), and a window shown at zero size (first configured on resize) | (1) `pdfcraft` `tests::a_window_larger_than_the_gpu_limit_gets_a_surface_within_it`, `tests::surface_fit_never_empties_or_overflows_a_surface`, and `tests::vendor_provenance_egui_wgpu_surface_fit_identity`, which keeps the patch in the build and in the paths that size a surface; (2) `pdfcraft` `tests::a_gpu_error_while_a_window_is_set_up_is_returned_not_a_panic` (a real device: an error inside `catch_errors` is returned, not a panic) and `tests::vendor_provenance_egui_wgpu_catch_errors_identity`, which keeps it around `add_surface`'s configure |
|
||||
| vello_common | 0.0.8 | Apache-2.0 OR MIT | (1) `clip::intersect` (the clip step every clipped path passes through) starts its row walk at the first row both paths have strips in, not the earlier of the two first rows. The walk visited every row from the top of the clip for each path (on the A1 sample's full-page canvas, about half its strip rows per stroke), and rows where one path has no strips produce no output, so the strips are unchanged (vello_common 0.1 starts at the later row too). Its cost grew with the page, and a full-page render of the A1 sample was about 30% faster; the output is byte-identical | (1) `clip::tests::intersect_walks_only_rows_both_paths_have_strips` counts the rows the walk visits (`cargo test --manifest-path vendor/vello_common/Cargo.toml`) and fails without the patch; the render crate's pixel tests run through the patched crate |
|
||||
|
||||
+42
@@ -114,6 +114,48 @@ pub(crate) fn get(
|
||||
dict: &Dict<'_>,
|
||||
id: &[u8],
|
||||
password: &[u8],
|
||||
) -> Result<Decryptor, DecryptionError> {
|
||||
match decryptor(dict, id, password) {
|
||||
// PdfCraft patch (36): a document that encrypts only its embedded files, authorised when
|
||||
// one is opened (`/AuthEvent /EFOpen`, ISO 32000-2 §7.6.6, Table 25), opens without a
|
||||
// password: its strings and streams are in the clear, and nothing drawn reads an embedded
|
||||
// file.
|
||||
Err(DecryptionError::PasswordProtected) if password.is_empty() && efopen_only(dict) => {
|
||||
Ok(Decryptor::None)
|
||||
}
|
||||
other => other,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// PdfCraft patch (36): whether every crypt filter of `dict` that encrypts is authorised only when
|
||||
/// an embedded file is opened (`/AuthEvent /EFOpen`), `/EFF` names one, and neither `/StmF` nor
|
||||
/// `/StrF` does.
|
||||
fn efopen_only(dict: &Dict<'_>) -> bool {
|
||||
let Some(cf) = dict.get::<Dict<'_>>(CF) else {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
};
|
||||
let mut encrypting = Vec::new();
|
||||
for key in cf.keys() {
|
||||
let Some(filter) = cf.get::<Dict<'_>>(key.as_ref()) else {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
};
|
||||
let method = filter.get::<Name<'_>>(CFM).and_then(|n| DecryptorTag::from_name(&n));
|
||||
if matches!(method, None | Some(DecryptorTag::None)) {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if filter.get::<Name<'_>>(b"AuthEvent").is_none_or(|e| e.as_str() != "EFOpen") {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
encrypting.push(key.as_str().to_string());
|
||||
}
|
||||
let names = |key: &[u8]| dict.get::<Name<'_>>(key).is_some_and(|n| encrypting.iter().any(|e| e == n.as_str()));
|
||||
names(b"EFF") && !names(STM_F) && !names(STR_F)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn decryptor(
|
||||
dict: &Dict<'_>,
|
||||
id: &[u8],
|
||||
password: &[u8],
|
||||
) -> Result<Decryptor, DecryptionError> {
|
||||
let filter = dict.get::<Name<'_>>(FILTER).ok_or(InvalidEncryption)?;
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user