security: reject shell metacharacters in opened web links

Feed notice links and release-note hyperlinks are forwarded to the system opener
when clicked. The pinned webbrowser crate's WSL fallback passes the URL to
cmd.exe /c start while escaping only ^ and &, so a pipe (or other metacharacter) in
an otherwise valid https URL becomes a command separator and runs a Windows command
(CWE-78).

Rather than depend on the third-party opener to neutralise the URL, refuse any link
containing a shell/cmd metacharacter at the validation boundary, where a real https
web link never needs one:

- release::safe_web_link (release notes) now rejects shell metacharacters via the
  shared release::is_shell_meta, on top of the existing scheme/host/whitespace checks.
- The feed notice link filter routes through the same rule and also rejects control
  characters.

Addresses finding: widgets.rs/webbrowser WSL fallback CWE-78.
This commit is contained in:
Dylan M. Taylor committed 2026-10-22 13:02:34 -04:00
1 parent fe2534d51b
commit af4270fb6d
2 files changed
+40 -7

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+11 -5
View File
@@ -407,9 +407,13 @@ impl RawNotice {
if self.title.trim().is_empty() && self.body.trim().is_empty() {
return None;
}
let link = self
.maybe_web_link
.filter(|l| (l.starts_with("https://") || l.starts_with("http://")) && l.len() <= 2000 && !l.chars().any(char::is_whitespace));
// The link may reach the system opener (whose WSL fallback shells out), so refuse any
// shell/cmd metacharacter or control character in it as well as whitespace (CWE-78).
let link = self.maybe_web_link.filter(|l| {
(l.starts_with("https://") || l.starts_with("http://"))
&& l.len() <= 2000
&& !l.chars().any(|c| c.is_whitespace() || c.is_control() || release::is_shell_meta(c))
});
Some(Notice {
id: format!("{kind}:{}:{}", self.created_at.as_deref().unwrap_or(""), self.title.trim()),
title: truncate(self.title.trim(), 200),
@@ -612,7 +616,8 @@ mod tests {
"\"alerts\": []",
r#""alerts": [
{"title": "Security update", "body": "Update PdfCraft now.", "maybe_web_link": "https://getartcraft.com/security", "created_at": null},
{"title": "Bad link", "body": "x", "maybe_web_link": "javascript:alert(1)"}]"#,
{"title": "Bad link", "body": "x", "maybe_web_link": "javascript:alert(1)"},
{"title": "Shell link", "body": "x", "maybe_web_link": "https://getartcraft.com/a|calc.exe"}]"#,
)
.replace(
"\"app_renames\": []",
@@ -620,9 +625,10 @@ mod tests {
"new_name_lower": "docucraft", "description": "Same app, new name.", "renamed_at": "2026-10-09T08:00:00Z"}]"#,
);
let feed = Feed::parse(&with_notices).unwrap();
assert_eq!(feed.alerts.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(feed.alerts.len(), 3);
assert_eq!(feed.alerts[0].link.as_deref(), Some("https://getartcraft.com/security"));
assert_eq!(feed.alerts[1].link, None, "only web links are kept");
assert_eq!(feed.alerts[2].link, None, "a link with shell metacharacters is dropped");
let titles: Vec<&str> = feed.announcements.iter().map(|n| n.title.as_str()).collect();
assert_eq!(titles, ["New: CADCraft 1.0", "PdfCraft is now DocuCraft"]);
// Ids are stable across parses, so dismissals stick.
+29 -2
View File
@@ -61,11 +61,28 @@ fn is_hex64(s: &str) -> bool {
}
/// Whether `url` is safe to hand to the system browser from untrusted text (release notes):
/// `https` only, a host, no user-info, no spaces or control characters.
/// `https` only, a host, no user-info, no spaces or control characters, and no shell metacharacters.
///
/// The system opener is not always a direct `open`: the pinned `webbrowser` crate's WSL fallback
/// passes the URL to `cmd.exe /c start` while escaping only `^` and `&`, so a character like `|`
/// in an otherwise valid URL becomes a command separator (CWE-78). Because a legitimate
/// `https://` web link never needs these characters unescaped, we refuse any URL that contains a
/// shell/cmd metacharacter rather than rely on the opener to neutralise it.
pub fn safe_web_link(url: &str) -> bool {
let Some(rest) = url.strip_prefix("https://") else { return false };
let authority = rest.split(['/', '?', '#']).next().unwrap_or_default();
url.len() <= 2000 && !authority.is_empty() && !authority.contains(['@', '\\']) && !url.chars().any(|c| c.is_control() || c.is_whitespace())
url.len() <= 2000
&& !authority.is_empty()
&& !authority.contains(['@', '\\'])
&& !url.chars().any(|c| c.is_control() || c.is_whitespace())
&& !url.chars().any(is_shell_meta)
}
/// Characters a command interpreter (POSIX shells or `cmd.exe`) may treat specially. A real
/// `https` URL never needs any of them unescaped in a browser-opened link. `%` matters because
/// `cmd.exe` expands `%NAME%` references, and an expanded value could itself carry metacharacters.
pub fn is_shell_meta(c: char) -> bool {
matches!(c, '|' | '&' | ';' | '<' | '>' | '(' | ')' | '$' | '`' | '"' | '\'' | '^' | '!' | '*' | '%' | '{' | '}' | '[' | ']')
}
/// The prefix every download of `repo` must start with.
@@ -216,6 +233,16 @@ mod tests {
"https://example.com/a b",
"https://example.com/\nx",
"https:///path",
// Shell/cmd metacharacters: the WSL opener fallback shells out, so these must be
// refused even inside an otherwise valid https URL (CWE-78).
"https://example.com/a|calc",
"https://example.com/p?x=1&y=2",
"https://example.com/`id`",
"https://example.com/$(whoami)",
"https://example.com/a;b",
"https://example.com/a>b",
"https://example.com/%COMSPEC%",
"https://example.com/%PATH%",
] {
assert!(!safe_web_link(bad), "{bad:?}");
}